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This thesis examines the Venezuelan military expenditures
pattern, the arms production experiences in Latin America and its
possible causes, and the Venezuelan economic, military and
production capabilities.
The suggestion is made that Venezuela should expand its arms
industries development programs in order to reduce imports,
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Arms production and military sales have traditionally
been subject of controversy and discussion. Their purpose
and their political and social-economic costs have been
centers of attention and objects of extensive and detailed
studies in both producer and customer countries.
These studies—normally criticisms--have contributed
to the better understanding of the arms-procurement and
arms-production process. They have heightened perceptions
that each nation has in respect to its own necessities.
Each country defends, and has the right to defend, the
position it considers more important or advantageous to its
citizens and particular interests. The constitution of each
state establishes in express or implicit ways the obligation
to protect the national integrity, to protect its scope of
influence, and to defend its own interests in the ways they
are best perceived by its leaders.
The protection of sovereignty and the defense of
autonomy and independence are sensitive points of public
opinion. They are decisive factors in the political process
entailed in the acquisition of military equipment and arms
systems.
Decision makers must look for alternative solutions
for the acquisition of the military equipment required to
protect the national security policies for two basic
reasons: the ever increasing cost of the arms systems in the
world market; and the scarcity of financial resources to
allocate among the other state necessities.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the idea of
developing an arms-production capability in Venezuela as an
alternative way to acquiring the required armament and
weapons systems in the international market.
In order to develop a logical argument, Chapter II
reviews the Venezuela military expenditures in the last
years and trends they may follow. Chapter III reviews the
possible causes for and advantages of developing an arms
production capability. Chapter IV explores the production
experiences in Latin American countries and examines its
common factors. Chapter V outlines the characteristics of
the defence sector in Venezuela, its armed forces and its
military industry. Finally, Chapter VI draws a numbers of
policy implications and recommendations for defense
production in Venezuela.
II. ARMS TRADE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES
The definition of the National Security Policy, the
allocation of the resources needed for the development of
the national security policy, and the efficiency with which
the resources are distributed or invested in the pursuit of
the national security objectives are the main concepts
involved in the understanding of military expenditures.
National security policy will be a response to the
leaders' perception of the national objectives
,
threats to
the country, recent conflicts, and assumptions about the
international system and security alignments. Resource
allocation will depend on (1) "the quantity of resources
available now and in the future; (2) the proportion of these
resources allocated to the national security purpose"
[Ref . 1] . Finally, the efficient use of the resources
allocated for the pursuit of the national security policy
in the case of the military objectives will depend on
dividing them efficiently among strategies, tactics,
forces, and equipment.
Because of the complexity of the factors involved, it
is always difficult to measure the actual defense needs of
a country. Given that difficulty, it is traditional for the
perception of national security needs to be measured in
terms of how much money is allocated for defense.
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It is generally assumed that a country which devotes
more resources to developing a military force is more
committed to its defense . However, "a country's military
expenditures," the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
points out, "are not necessarily representative of military
capability. They do not define a country's efficiency or
allocation of expenditures or 'whether the quantity and
quality of forces supported by them serves national
purposes ." [Ref. 2].
It is within this scenario that this chapter analyzes
Venezuela's military expenditures and arms trade.
A. MILITARY EXPENDITURES
In analyzing Venezuela's military expenditures we
shall review the following parameters:
1 . Military Expenditures:
Representing the monetary value of the resource
allocation in pursuit of the development of a military
capability. These include:
" (a) Compensation of military and civilian personnel,
including reserves;
(b) Procurement of equipment;
(c) operation and maintenance;
(d) Construction of military facilities;
(e) Research and development ." [Ref . 3]
This value is affected, as stated before, by the
amount of resources available, the deflator and other
conversion rates used in the original data and, by itself,
it does not represent the country's defense effort. However
the rate of growth during a given period represents the
tendency of the effort.
Table 2-1 shows the Venezuela Military Expenditures
during the years 1971-1984. The data, for this and others
tables, is expressed in millions of U.S. Dollars ($) and was
taken from the U.S World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers 1986 Report. The constant dollars are expressed in




YEARS CURRENT CONSTANT GROWTH
1974 519 987
1975 675 1172 18.74
1976 568 928 -20.82
1977 705 1087 17.13
1978 793 1131 4.05
1979 785 1036 -8.40
1980 747 903 -12.84
1981 721 807 -10.63
1982 1143 1196 48.20
1983 995 995 -16.81
1984 1067 1031 3.62
SOURCE: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1986.
Another factor that makes the analysis of the
military expenditures difficult is determining the correct
amount to be expended in defense. How much is enough? Is
the country expending too much or too little? The morale
of the soldiers, the correct or efficient use of the
resources, the internal political stability, geopolitical
position, and the country's social and economic welfare are
among other factors to consider when analyzing defense
capabilities in order to determine the correct amount to be
expended.
Since defense, by one definition, is the protection
of a country against military actions by other countries, it
seems logical to utilize comparisons as an effective way to
measure the adequacy of the level of expenditures. Table 2-2
shows rates of growth of military expenditures in various
regions of the world in the last decade in comparison with
Venezuelan rates.
TABLE 2-2
MILITARY EXPENDITURES RATE OF GROWTH
74-79 80-84 74-84
World 2. 3 3.5 2 .9
Developed Countries 1.9 3.6 2.8
Developing Countries 4. 1 2.8 3.5
Latin America 4 .6 4.4 4.3
Venezuela 2. 1 2 . 3 2.2
SOURCE: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1986
As is shown in Table 2-2 the Venezuelan military
expenditures rate of growth during the period 1971-1984 was
less than that in other regions of the world.
2 . Military Expenditures as Percent of G.N. P.
Representing the military expenditures as a
percentage of the monetary value of all the final goods and
services produced by an economy during a given period.
This value is widely used as representative of the
military effort. However, as the government does not have
control over the total of the G.N. P., and cannot know in
advance what proportion of G.N. P. the budgeted military
expenditures will be, this measure cannot be representative
of the leaders' intentions with respect to the national
defense. [Ref . 4
]
In the case of the analysis of the Venezuelan
military expenditures, Table 2-3 shows a comparison of
military expenditures as percentages of the Gross National
Product of the world during the period 1974-1984.
TABLE 2-3





Developed Countries 5.58 5.80 5.69
Developing Countries 6. 17 6.12 6. 15
Latin America 1. 63 1.80 1.72
Venezuela 1. 61 1.46 1.53
Source: World Military Expenditures and arms Transfer 1986.
The Venezuelan military expenditures as a percentage
of G.N. P. was lower than those of other regions of the
world. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament
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Agency ranks Venezuela as 114 of 144 countries of the world
for the year 1984.
3 . Military Expenditures as Percent of C.G.E.
Representing the percentage of the central
government expenditures devoted to the military effort. This
measurement is more representative of the leaders' and the
government's priorities and intentions in relation to the
national defense objectives.
TABLE 2-4
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS PERCENT OF C.G.E.
74-79 80-84 74-84
World 21.58 19.78 20.68
Developed Countries 21.47 19.80 20.63
Developing Countries 21.92 19.80 20.86
Latin America 7.35 6.52 6.94
Venezuela 5.25 4.82 5.03
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1986.
The Venezuela military expenditures as percentages
of the Central Government Expenditures were far below what
might be expected, and the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency ranked Venezuela as country 109 over 144
countries analyzed for 1984.
In analyzing military expenditures, questions can
arise about the reasons for then and what direction they are
taking. What are the factors that underline or determine the
expenditures? Are they determined by threats to the
national security from internal or external forces or by
the simple availability of resources?
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In a 1973 study of defense expenditures and military
rule in Latin America, Schmitter concludes that the single
best explanatory factor for the rise or fall of military
budgets in individual countries was the performance in
G.N. P. [Ref. 5]
Gertrude Heare found in a 1971 study of six leading
military spenders in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Venezuela) during the period 1940-1970
that absolute expenditures in constant price tended to rise
as national economies grew, that expenditures jumped notably
with internal conflicts, with periods of economic
prosperity, or when there were specific attempts to catch
up with lags in construction, pay scales, or equipment
replacements. She also noted that military budgets decline
in time of economic depression or hardship. [Ref. 6]
In 1986 Robert E. Looney in his book "The Political
of Latin America Defense Expenditures : Case Study of
Venezuela and Argentina", performed an analysis of the
Venezuela military expenditures during the period 1950-1983
to determine the main factors underlining the decision of
the resource allocation. By analyzing the military
expenditures as a percentage of the G.N. P., C.G.E., and
Central Government Revenues, and by introducing dummy
variables in the regression equation to test for the effects
of the oil-price increase and a possible structural shift
associated with the different parties in the Venezuelan
government, he concluded that "while the increase in oil
revenues has greatly facilitated the increase in the
allocation to the defense sector, during the 1970s, that
sector received relatively small allocations in the light of
the amount of funds suddenly placed at the disposal of the
government. Again, defense expenditures in the country
appear to be quite stable, neither reduced in line with
other government programs during periods of austerity, nor
increased dramatically during periods of af fluence" [Ref . 7].
By analyzing the defense expenditures of Peru, Mexico,
Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, and its possible effects he
concluded "that Venezuela military expenditures have been
determined largely by development internal to that country
(oil revenues and increased Gross Domestic Product) , with
military expenditure patterns of regional countries
affecting allocation for Venezuela defense marginally, if
at all. " [Ref. 8]
4 . Summary
In summary, from the Venezuela military
expenditures analysis, the following conclusions can be
derived:
a. The Venezuelan military expenditures have been much
less than could be expected when measured by the parameters
of G.N. P., G.D.P., C.G.E. and compared with other countries
or regions of the world.
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b. The trend in Venezuela military expenditures trend
has been determined more by internal factors, such as
economic development than by external threats.
c. The Venezuelan military expenditures tend to be stable
in relation to other Central Government Expenditures and are
not greatly affected by fluctuations in the Government
evenues.
B. ARMS TRADE
Another important factor in the analysis of the
Military expenditures is the analysis of the Arms Trade in
its absolute value, as a percentage of total military
expenditures and in proportion to the total imports of the
country.
1 . Arms Import /Export.
Representing the monetary value of the arms trade
in the international market. As in the case of the analysis
of the military expenditures the value of the imports by
itself does not tell us much about the country's intentions
as does the rate of change that the value is having. In the
analysis of the rate of growth in the Venezuelan case we
find that during the period 1976-80 the average rate of
growth was 33.5 % and, that during the period 1981-85 was
118.4 %, representing a dramatic change if we remember that
during the same periods the military expenditures rate of
growth were of 2.1 % and 2.3 % respectability.
11
2 . Arms Imports/Total Military Expenditures.
Representing the proportion of the total military
expenditures devoted to arms imports. During the period
TABLE 2-5
VENEZUELA ARMS TRANSFERS 1975-1985
YEARS CURRENT CONSTANT GROWTH IMPORTXEXPORT
1975 90 156 1.5
1976 60 98 -37.18 0.8
1977 100 154 57.14 0.9
1978 30 43 -72.08 0.3
1979 40 53 23.26 0.4
1980 130 157 196.23 1.1
1981 290 325 107.01 2.2
1982 250 261 -19.69 1.9
1983 50 50 -80.00 0.6
1984 360 348 596.00 4.9
1985 330 309 -11.21 4.0
SOURCE: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1986.
1975-1979 the average percentage of the military
expenditures expended in arms imports was 9.4 % and during
the period between 1980-84 the average was 23.65 %, which
represents a marked increase in the importance of the arms
imports
.
3 . Arms Import/ Total imports.
Representing the proportion of the total resources
utilized for imports devoted to armament import. During the
period 1975-80 the average proportion between arms import
over total imports was of 0.79 % and during the period of
1981-85 the average was of 2.73 % which represent a
notorious increase. Moreover, during the years 1984-85 the
proportion increase for an average of 4.45 %.
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TABLE 2-6







1976 928 98 10.56
1977 1087 154 14.17
1978 1131 43 3.80
1979 1036 53 5.12
1980 903 157 17.39
1981 807 325 40.27
1982 1196 261 21.82
1983 925 50 5.03
1984 1131 348 33.75
SOURCE: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1986.
On February 18, 1983, the Venezuelan government
changed the parity relationship between the national
currency, the Bolivar, and the dollar, establishing an
exchange control and causing a clear change in the country's
behavior with respect to imports. The total imports fell
from an annual average of 14157.5 millions U.S. dollars
during the period 1975-82, to an average of 8088.6 millions
U.S. dollars during the period 1983-85 representing a
decrease of 42.8 % of the total imports. However the
behavior of the arms import did not change, and during the
same period the arms imports increased by a rate of 168.2 6
percent.
In the absence of any external or internal
destabilizing factors the different behaviors can only be
explained by the fact that Venezuela does not produce arms
and the government wishes to continue with the policy of
renewing or increasing the arms endowment of the armed
13
forces no matter what the economic situation of the country.
This behavior is consistent with the preceding conclusion
that the military expenditures tend to maintain a stable
relationship with overall government expenditures.
4 . Summary
From the analysis of the arms trade the following
conclusions can be derived:
a. The change in the currency value did not affect the
arms imports behavior.
b. The reduction in total imports make the arms imports
more important in the overall foreign currency exchange of
the country.
c. The country has increased its rate of arms imports
while maintaining an almost constant rate of total military
expenditures. Thus, we see, a smaller proportion of
military expenditures in gross national product over time.
C. ALTERNATIVES
In general we can conclude that Venezuela military
expenditures during the past decade have been stable, with
a tendency to increase the arms-import expenditures more
than to increase the total military expenditures. The
economic conditions of the country have changed. The
decreasing oil revenues and the ever-increasing needs that
compete for the resources allocation, present the country
leaders with very difficult decisions regarding the
14
military expenditures, where three main alternatives can be
easily identified.
1 . Decrease in the Military Expenditures
Venezuelan military expenditures are not likely to
be reduced in the near future. Everybody would agree that
the money expend in defense would be better allocated to in
social and economic development in a perfect world where
defense was unnecessary. Unfortunately, this is not the
case. The political situation of Central America and the
Caribbean, the ever-growing power of the Cuban Armed Forces,
the territorial differences with Colombia and Guyana, and
the necessity of maintaining an anti-guerrilla capability
able to cope with the potential infiltration of the M-19 and
F.A.L.C. revolutionary groups of Colombia, demand that
Venezuela develop and maintain strong armed forces.
An argument for the use of the industrialized
countries 's umbrella-of-defense agreement implies that
national interests of both protector and protected are the
same. Often the interests may be similar or related, but
will be interpreted and articulated differently. Also, such
an agreement carries the potential for uninvited external
interventions. Not only are the military forces of one's own
nation symbols of sovereignty and independence, but more
important, they are reliable and will better defend national
interests as defined by national leadership. [Ref. 9]
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Finally, a reduction of the already proportionally
low military expenditures will constrain Venezuela's limited
ability to ensure proper equipment maintenance and will




Reduction in Arms Imports .
Given the weakness of the Venezuelan national
currency in the international money market and the
increasing arms imports in absolute and proportional
value, it seems logical to want to reduce the military
imports in order to reduce the use of foreign currency.
But, today's world of changing technology has greatly
affected military requirements. The quality prevails over
the quantity; efficiency and modernization are more
important than numbers. Today war require highly
sophisticated equipment, which can only be found in the
international market. But, if the equipment is needed and
can only be find in the international market, how can
Venezuela reduce its arms imports? It seems clear that if a
country does not have a production capability and wants to
maintain its defense and military capability it needs to
keep importing arms no matter the cost, and no matter the
prevailing economic conditions.
3 Develop an Arms Production Capability .
The third alternative, and the objective of study
in this thesis, is the possibility of developing an arms
16
production capability that could gradually substitute for
the arms importation and eventually increase the country's
defense capacity and contribute to its economic growth.
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III. ARMS PRODUCTION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WHY?
A. GENERAL
The changing role of the Less Developed Countries
(LDC) in the international arms market, from importer to
producers and, in some cases, to exporters has recently been
the cause of several studies and is now one of the most
discussed trends in arms transfers. [Ref. 10]
Many LDCs have initiated indigenous defense
productions capabilities with degrees of self sufficiency
which vary from developing maintenance and overhaul capacity
to designing and manufacturing domestic weapons systems
utilizing all domestic components. They have made a
commitment to reduce the external or international
dependence on arms suppliers. Table 3-1 show the value of
arms production in the third world from 1950 to 1984
[Ref. 11] In it we can see that arms production was strongly
limited during the 1950s. It started its growth during the
middle of the 1960s, when the production value increased by
a factor of five between 1964-69. The period of growth
lasted along with the arms-trade increase until the
beginning of the 1980s, when it stopped, probably because of
the global economic crisis.
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TABLE 3-1
VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF MAJOR WEAPONS IN THE THIRD WORLD
1950-1984
YEARS INDIGENOUS LICENSED TOTAL
1950 2.00 1.00 2.00
1951 4. 00 1.00 4.00
1952 2.00 1.00 3.00
1953 4.00 1.00 5.00
1954 3.00 3.00
1955 6.00 6. 00
1956 2.00 1.00 3 .00
1957 17.00 1.00 18. 00
1958 22.00 1.00 23 . 00
1959 26.00 26.00
1960 11.00 11.00
1961 9.00 8.00 17.00
1962 10.00 10.00 20.00
1963 10.00 30.00 40.00
1964 16.00 24.00 50.00
1965 33.00 34.00 67.00
1966 24.00 51.00 75.00
1967 52.00 103.00 105. 00
1968 71.00 147.00 218.00
1969 68.00 163.00 252.00
1970 92.00 182.00 274.00
1971 106.00 211.00 317.00
1972 184.00 243.00 427.00
1973 276.00 265.00 541.00
1974 357.00 274.00 632.00
1975 349.00 298.00 648.00
1976 371.00 448.00 820.00
1977 382.00 453.00 834.00
1978 432.00 340.00 772.00
1979 482.00 453.00 935.00
1980 470.00 510.00 980. 00
1981 673.00 542.00 1215. 00
1982 589.00 408.00 997. 00
1983 602.00 569.00 1170.00
1984 635.00 512.00 1147.00
Total 6390.00 6317.00 12707. 00
SOURCE: SIPRI
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The numbers of producer countries also increased.
During the 1950s only a few LDCs were involved in
production efforts. Those included Argentina, Egypt and in
lesser degree Colombia, India and North Korea. [Ref. 11] In
1984, 47 countries were to some degree armament
exporters. [Ref . 12]
The development of an arms-production capability
reguires a large capital investment, technology difficult
to obtain, and human resources which could, perhaps, be
better used in social and civil development. When it
depends on the government, as in the Venezuelan case, the
military production can have a political cost.
It has been argued that the money spent in defense
could be better used for others purposes. President
Eisenhower said:
11 The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this:
-A modern brick school in more than 30 cities
-It is two electric power plants, each
serving a town of 60.000 population.
-It is two fine, fully eguipped hospitals.
-It is some 50 miles of concrete highways."
[Ref. 13]
B. THE CAUSES.
If the development of an arms-production capacity is so
difficult and the related cost so high, why are so many
countries developing such capacity? There is no single
answer to this guestion, however some of the reasons that
can be argued are:
20
1 . Substitution of Arms Imports .
The substitution of arms imports is the first reason
for developing arms-production capabilities. It is
based on economic, political and, military considerations.
a. In the Economic Area.
In the economic area the following reasons can be
used to explain the desire for developing an arms-production
capability:
(1) The ever-increasing price of arms in the
international market.
(2) The negative effect of the arms-transfer cost in the
balance of payments.
(3) The almost always obligatory use of foreign currency
in the transaction and its implicit cost in the monetary
exchange.
(4) The opportunity cost of the arms transfers in terms
of economic growth, employment, etc.
b. In The Political Area.
In the political area the following reasons can
be use to explain the desire for developing an arms
production capability:
(1) To avoid the political influence of the producer
countries.
(2) To avoid the necessity of the political compromises
or alliances required to obtain the opportunity to buy arms
from a producer country.
21
c. In the Military Area.
In the military area the following reasons can be
used to explain the desire of developing arms-production
capabilities:
(1) To avoid military dependence.
(2) To avoid the influence of other countries military
forces
.
(3) To have the equipment designed to the specific
requirement and by citizens of the country.
(4) To maintain the levels of security classification.
(5) To simplify the logistic chain.
2 . To Reduce the Dependence on Outside, Unpredictable
and Often Unreliable Suppliers .
Other important reason for developing an arms
production capability can be seen in the reduction of the
dependence on outside, unpredictable and often unreliable
suppliers.
"Governments procure armaments essentially for
three purposes: To enhance the national security, to promote
regimen stability, and to expand the economic growth."
[Ref. 14] In order to be able to accomplish those objectives
of arms procurement, the country must deal with an armament
supplier that is reliable and dependable. This is not always
the case. It seems that the buyer-supplier relationship is
different during peace time from what it is during war time.
22
During peace time the relationship is normally one
of bilateral government-to-government agreements, where the
buyer or recipient can choose to obtain arms from the
government itself or through many of the government sources.
In time of war the situation is different and varies
according to the nature and duration of the conflict.
Stephanie G. Neuman, in analyzing the arms trade in nine (9)
recent wars stated "as a rule, long wars have a disruptive
impact upon pre-war bilateral supplier-recipient
relationship. Here the change is norm rather that exception.
For example, of the four LDCs that have waged conventional
battles lasting two years or more, all have altered their
pattern of procurement because of superpower resupply
restrictions." [Ref. 15]. An example can be seen in the
Iran- Iraq war, where both contending countries did change
their main suppliers.
In short wars the situations have not been
different. The arms embargoes are a common restriction faced
by a LDC when enter in war. That was the case during the
Falkland/Malvinas War when Argentina faced an arms embargo
from all the European Countries during the conflict.
3 . To Help the Development of an Industrial Base
A third reason for developing an arms production
capability is to strengthen the industrial base of the
country.
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The complexity of an arms system requires in its
production a structure with different levels of technology.
It involves a complex hierarchy of contractors,
subcontractors and vendors. A single firm can be
contractor on one part and subcontractor in other. The
first contractor will produce major assemblies, such as
firing systems, the second level will produce electronic
black boxes and so on.
Due to economies of scale, one characteristic of
Third World industry is having a production rate below the
design, capacity or having " slack capacity." The decision
to develop an arms-production capability within the country
should help the industry by using this slack capacity, and
should motivate the development of other industries.
4 . To Increase the Country's Political Independence
Another potential benefit of the developing of an
arms production capability is the increase in political
independence.
Arms transfers are instrument of foreign policy.
Former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in his 30 June 1977
report to Congress summarized the uses of these instruments
as follows:
" To support diplomatic efforts to resolve major
regional conflicts by maintaining local balances and
enhancing our access and influence vis-a-vis the parties;
To influence the political orientation of nations
which control strategic resources;
To help maintain regional balances among nations
important to us in order to avert war or political shifts
away from us;
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To enhance the quality and commonality of the
capabilities of major allies participating with us in joint
defense arrangements;
To promote self-sufficiency in deterrence an
defense as a stabilizing factor in itself and as a means of
reducing the level and automaticity of possible American
involvement;
To strengthen the internal security and stability
of recipients;
To limit Soviet influence and maintain the balance
in conventional arms;
To enhance our general access to and influence
with government and military elites whose political
orientation counts for us on global or regional issues;
To provide leverage and influence with individual
governments on specific issues of immediate concern to us;
To secure base rights, overseas facilities, and
transit rights to support the development and operations of
our forces and intelligence systems." [Ref. 16]
President Reagan's position related to arms transfer
can be summarized through this quotation: "The United
States views the arms transfer of conventional arms as an
essential element of its global defense posture and as an
indispensable component of its foreign policy." [Ref. 17]
Soviet strategy and political motives for arms
transfer could be easily the same, with the additional
motive for the Soviet leadership of penetrating traditional
regions of U.S. influence [Ref. 18]. The British posture is
that its arms-sales programs promote a basic principle of
the United Nations. "The right of each state to ensure its
own sovereignty and defense.
"
[Ref . 19]
Some author have said that French arms sales are
solely directed and compelled by domestic economic
consideration [Ref. 20]. Yet, Edward Kolodziej has insisted
it would be a mistake to argue that French arms sales are
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entirely for economic motives. "French arms transfer
behavior reflect a more basic demand for an independent
arms-production capability as a means by which to provide
some maneuver and leverage in bargaining with other states,
particulary superpowers." [Ref. 21]
In general, arms trade is a source of political
influence, and developing an arms production capability
should reduce the arms imports and with that, the political
influence of the foreign countries.
5 . To Generate Economic Benefits
A further potential reason for developing an arms
production capability is that of the economic effects.
While common sense would seem to indicate increased defense
expenditures are likely to harm a LDCs, development
efforts, economic theory does not provide any clear
prediction of how the net impact of an increase in the
military burden would influence growth, development, or
welfare
.
Classical theory, for example, will predict, on the
basis of resource allocation, that an increase in defense
will decrease in investment and/or civilian consumption and
thus reduce growth and welfare [Ref. 22]. An increase in
military burden would, in this situation, have to be
justified on the basis of other social-welfare gains, such
as an increment in collective security. Keynasian theory on
the other hand, implies that in the presence of inadequate
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effective demand, the operation of the income multiplier
would imply an increase in national product, resulting from
additional defense expenditures; thus, there are purely
economic rationales for increased military spending. More
specifically, for economies operating with substantial
excess capacity, additional demand and output from expanded
military expenditure will increase capacity utilization,
thereby increasing the rate of profit and possibly
accelerating investment. Whether, in the short or long
run, the former or latter effect dominates will determine
the final outcome of defense on growth. [Ref. 23]
Among others, Rothschild, Benoit, Frederiksen and
Looney, Lim, Deger and Sen, and Leontief and Duchin have
examined various aspects of the defense-growth debate.
Rothschild, who considered the pattern of rank correlations
across growth, exports, and military spending for fourteen
OECD countries over 1956-69, concluded cautiously that
increased military spending tends to reduce exports and to
lower economic growth. [Ref. 24] Benoit used data for
forty-four less developed countries pertaining to the
period 1950-60 and employed a specification that included
investment, defense spending, and foreign aid. He found a
strong positive association between defense spending and
growth of civilian output per capita. [Ref. 25]
Frederiksen and Looney also specified an equation
including investment and defense outlay as regressors, but
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they made a distinction between resource constrained and
unconstrained LDCs. Using data for a fairly large cross
sectional sample pertaining to the period 1960-78, they
concluded that increased defense spending helped economic
growth in the resource-rich cases, but not in the resource
constrained LDCs.[Ref. 26] Lim examined, within the
framework of the Harrod-Domar model, a sample of fifty-four
countries for the period 1965-73 and concluded that higher
defense spending hurt economic growth [Ref. 27].
Deger and Sen reported that econometric evidence
for India indicates that claims about the positive effect
of military expenditure on economic growth are exaggerated
and that the economic spinoff from defense to development
is weak [Ref. 28]. In an input-output framework, Leontief
and Duchin have concluded that evidence presented by them
"suggests that virtually all economies are able to increase
total output and per capita consumption as they
progressively reduce their military spending"
.
[Ref . 29]
Clearly, the diversity of these results and those of
other similar studies is rather disquieting. These mixed
empirical findings have led Stephanie Neuman to conclude
that "despite the volume of writing on the subject, we
still do not know whether there is a causal relationship
between military expenditures and development, much less
what the relationship is. "[Ref. 30] In a similar vein,
Gavin Kennedy observed that for the less developed
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countries during the 1960s there was "no obvious
relationship between growth rates and percentage allocated
to defense." He argued instead that the relationship
between military expenditures and economic growth will
"depend on circumstances" and will "not follow some general
law applicable to all times and places.
"
[Ref. 31]
As some analyst have already noted, the search for
universal patterns to all places and time are likely to be
disappointing. [Ref . 32]
Robert E. Looney defined as the main limitations of
the previous research on the defense-growth controversy the
following:
a. The treatment of developing countries as a rather
homogeneous group for examining the defense growth
relationship.
b. The lack of analysis of the manner in which the
interaction of indigenous arms industries and increased
defense burdens impact on various macroeconomic facets, to
determine the overall net impact on growth.
He also pointed out that, where there is excess
capacity, it is clear enough that spending on arms and
military personnel will add to aggregate demand and thus
growth. In most poor countries where there is little
sophisticated industry and no domestic arms production, the
demand injections from spending on military eguipment will
probably leak to suppliers abroad. However, the presence of
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an indigenous arms industry should help internalize the
impact of military expenditure on demand and hence growth.
And then, when testing the impact of military
expenditures on overall growth over 1970-1982 period, he
conclude that:
a. For the total sample, the military burden was
statistically insignificant in effecting growth. The only
statistically significant variables were the growth in
investment and expanded government deficits, which possibly
impacted on the overall growth.
b. When the Third World countries are examined as
sub-groups, it can be seem that for the arms producer, the
growth of investment was also a major determinant of
overall growth. The military burden did, however, provide
a stimulus to growth over and above that provided by the
expanded investment. The results for the non-producers show
overall growth to be a function of the overall growth on
investment and, negatively to the average military
burden. [Ref . 33]
It seems logical to conclude, after reviewing the
different postures related with the economic effects of
military expenditures, that having an arms production
capability will produce favorable effect in the economic
growth, or at least will help to minimize most of the
adverse impact on economy often associated with increased
military burden.
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6 . To Development or Enforce National Prestige and
Pride
"The symbolic importance of arms production
programs cannot be overlooked.
"
[Ref. 34] The capacity of
producing the reguired arms system provides countries with
national prestige and enhances their regional influence.
The pride that Argentineans take in their locally produced
tanks and aircraft, or the Brazilians 1 pride in their
planes or ships is great and widespread. [Ref. 35] Arms-
production capabilities are also developed for the status
they confer externally, and for the prestige that results
at home. In explaining the expanded emphasis on nuclear-
energy resource in Brazil, a nuclear-energy administrator
made this comment in Brazil's official military journal, A
Defensa Nacional : "The Brazilian people need to be proud of
their country for other, more serious reasons than football





IV. ARMS PRODUCTION EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
A. GENERAL
It is the purpose of this chapter to review arms
production experiences in the less developed countries and
more specifically in Latin America.
In order to better understand the process of
developing an arms production capability, we shall review
the characteristics of the Latin America producers, the
definition and characteristics of the alternative ways for
the obtainment of technology transfer and finally, the
common factor in the productive countries.
In recent years, the less developed countries have been
changing their behavior with respect to arms system
acquisitions, going from total import to developing
production capabilities with varying degrees of complexity
and self sufficiency. Variations include:
"1. Maintenance and overhaul capability.
2. Domestic assembly under license of unassembled
kits from major suppliers.
3. Coproduction, in which basic components are
produced endogenously while major items such as
engines and electronics are imported.
4. Modification of coproduced or unassembled
weapons with larger proportions of domestically
produced components incorporated.
5. Production of endogenously designed systems
with minimum dependence on foreign components.
6. Domestically designed and domestically





In the Appendix, Register of Indigenous and Licensed
Production of Major Conventional Weapons in Latin American
Countries, 1950-84, a list of the countries is provided in
alphabetical order with the information about the weapon
categories and characteristics, the year of production and,
the origin of the design.
B. LATIN AMERICA PRODUCERS
1 . Argentina
a. Background.
Argentina began its economic expansion in the
second half of the 19th century, based largely on the
production and export first of wool and then of meat. The
boom attracted capital and labor from Europe, allowing
Argentina to develop its infrastructure and an industrial
sector which was first confined to light industries but
later expanded to include heavy industries and domestic
arms production. During World War I, the production
declined but recovered significantly in the late 1920s.
Economic growth was heavily dependent on the ability of
manufacturing to expand, primarily by import-substitution
policies. [Ref. 38]
The long period of civilian rule (starting in
1852 with the fall of General Rosos) was interrupted in
September of 1930 by a military coup. The armed forces
became a significant factor in the political and economic
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process of the country. From 1930 until October of 1983,
Argentina had 24 presidents, of whom 16 were generals and
every elected government but two (Justo and Peron) was
overthrown by a military coup d'etat. [Ref. 39] The
military also played an important role in the development
of heavy industry, including iron and steel.
From the beginning of 1930 until the outbreak of
World War II, the public sector, on military lands, took
over majority ownership of most defense related companies
industries and services. The first military steel plant
(Fabrica Militar de Aceros) was founded in 1935, and half
a dozen other arms factories were constructed soon after.
During World War II and owing to Argentina's neutrality,
the United States imposed an arms embargo which promoted an
indigenous production of arms. As early as 1943, the army
officer corps became dedicated to "transforming Argentina
into a regimented industrial society geared to glory and
war." [Ref. 40]
In 1947 the embargo was lifted, and from the end
of the 1950s to the mid 1960s the situation changed. The
availability of cheap World War II surplus weapons and the
reorientation of the economy away from state intervention
and import substitution led to a decrease in production.
In 1966, the United States sharply reduced arms
deliveries (after a military coup). The Argentinean
government decided to turn to Europe for weapon purchases.
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The "Plan Europa" was launched. Arms imports were to be
accompanied by an inflow of arms production technology.
Contracts were signed with French firms for ship and tank
construction; with a Spanish-Swiss firm for the manufacture
of machine-guns, ammunition and air-to-surface missiles; and
with West German and British companies for work on
warships. The "Plan Europa" was intended to utilize the
existing arms-production capacities through transfers of
technology from abroad. [Ref. 41]
Arms-production activities increased sharply when
the military took power again in 1976. The military budget
grew as a reflection of military aspirations in the area.
Despite a strong preference for free market policies, the
military government heavily invested in the state-run
Argentine arms industry. Strategic interests outweighed
economic considerations, and the military proceeded to
develop an enormous military-industrial complex, including
further development of its nuclear programme. [Ref. 42]
At the end of 1983, the military government lost
power, discredited by the defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas
War. The new government has introduced changes in military
industries: control has been transferred to the civilian
Defense Minister, and military officers have been replaced
by civilian technicians in key managerial positions. [Ref.
43]
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b. Structure of Arms Production.
The Argentine Army had the leading role in
domestic arms production via the Direccion General de
Fabricaciones Militares (DGFM) . DGFM is a conglomerate
founded in 1941. It runs 14 military factories scattered
around the country that produce arms, communication
eguipment, chemicals, and steel, among other things. DGFM
has a majority share in at least seven other companies in
the steel, iron ore, petrochemical, timber and
construction sectors, as well as significant shares in a
further 10 companies, including the Bahia Blanca
petrochemical complex, another petrochemical plant in La
Plata, a ball-bearing plant (built at a cost of over $500
million), and Argentina's biggest steelworks. DGFM also
supervises the aircraft industry run by the Air Force and
the yards run by the Navy.[Ref. 44]
DGFM employs an estimated 40,000 people directly,
and a further 16,000 work in associate companies. About
one per cent of its employees are military officers,
mainly engineers, and the rest are civilians. At the end
of the 1970s annual turnover was reportedly more than two
per cent of the country's GDP (or $2.2 billion in current
dollars, including its associated companies)
.
[Ref . 45]
Not all of the production in the Fabricas
Militares is weapon-oriented. Much of the production of
basic materials and pre-products is sold to civilian
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customers and shipped on to the plants producing weapons as
end-products. Argentina has a long tradition of military
R&D, but its R&D policies have been inconsistent. In 1980,
Argentina devoted about $530 million to total R&D. This
fell to about $350 million in 1983. The share of funds for
military scientific and technological research is unknown.
The identifiable portion of military R&D has varied
sharply. In 1978, 17.94 per cent of total R&D officially
was for the Ministry of Defense, 0.20 percent for the Navy
and 1.72 percent for the Air Force. In 1983, the official
share of the Ministry of Defense was four per cent.[Ref. 46]
c. The product.
Argentina's arms industry has been able to
produce a wide variety of arms systems. Appendix shows
that major arms system produced by Argentina include 2
types of aircraft, nine armored vehicles, three types of
missiles and nine types of ships. Table 4-1 shows the
production of small arms and ammunition in Argentina and
its sources of technology.
d. Export and Policies.
Argentina does not export arms on a large scale.
Although Argentina's arms industry can be said to be
technologically on a par with, for example, Brazil's, it has
been devoted to national requirements rather than to
attracting Third World buyers.
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ARGENTINA SALES OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 1950-1984
(CONTINUED)
WEAPON YEAR OF NO.
RECIPIENT DESIGNATION DESCRIPTION DELIVERY DELIVERED COMMENTS
Central IA 58A Pucara COIN Negotiating
African
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Panama TAM MT (1985)
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The Argentine civilian government under Alfonsin
is seeking to increase its foreign arms sales. It intends
to establish an arms sales policy markedly different from
the past. The government has granted substantial authority
over foreign arms sales to the Foreign Ministry, rather
than to the military or the Ministry of Defense. The
government has also decided not to sell weapons that could
have a decisive impact on active conflicts or aggravate
regional tensions. While the civilian government is keen
to shed more light on the activities of the industry, it
also wants to boost its exports in order to lighten the debt
burden. [Ref. 47] Table 4-2 show the register of export of
major conventional weapons from Argentina, 1950-1984.
Since 1976 Argentina has increased its exports
of light weapons, mainly to Central America and often in
connection with military aid. Until mid-1982, when the
Falklands/Malvinas War prompted a withdrawal of military
personnel, Argentine military advisers played a major role
in training and financing Nicaraguan and anti-Sandinista
rebels. During the Somoza regime, Argentina delivered
ammunition, grenades and bombs. According to military and
government sources, in 1984 Argentina shipped $2.5 million
worth of arms intended for Nicaragua's anti-Sandinista
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In April 1982, El Salvador received a cargo of
arms from Argentina worth $17.2 million, including the
Argentine FNFAL 7.62 automatic rifle and the FMK-3
sub-machine-gun. [Ref. 49]
2 . Brazil .
a. Background.
Since its founding in the nineteenth century,
the Brazilian military and its concept of defense (and
development) have evolved organizationally and
operationally. The military's perceived need to protect
Brazil's borders, arising from an exaggerated fear of
attack, justified the creation of the first powder and
cartridge factories and the national arsenal after the
Paraguay War (1864-1870), a territorial dispute involving
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. [Ref. 50]
Frank McCann, Jr. has traced to early 1900 the perception
that Brazil needed an arms industry. This need was
originally tied to demands for a steel industry not only on
the basis of arms production but also because it could
provide Brazil with other logistical and technological
capabilities for national development.
In the 1930s, some officers believed that in
order for an arms industry to develop, the country as a
whole had to undergo broad industrial development; that is,
it was impossible to have the former without having the
latter. In line with this long-term mode of thinking, some
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army officers became trained in professional and
technological specialties earlier than their civilian
counterparts became trained in the "market." During the
1930s and 1940s, military officers were sent abroad for
training in oil drilling and refining. Other officers
studied steel technology and telecommunications, while
Brazil's Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME) was
producing graduates specialized in several fields which
would later be useful for the arms industry. [Ref. 51]
During WWII, Brazil helped to defeat the Axis
powers and in 1952 signed a defense pact with the U.S.
which limited the threat of foreign invasion and enabled to
acguire military equipment.
But, with the passage of time, Brazilians began
to notice that they were not benefiting from the
established "rules of the game." The United States
provided equipment, but operators had to be trained at
American military academies, according to American
standards. There was also no effort made to transfer
American military technology to Brazil. The Brazilian
military also had difficulty keeping up with technological
advancements in U. S . -supplied equipment. Brazilian attempts
to maintain the costly equipment largely failed, creating a
vicious and expensive cycle of dependence on the United
States for spare parts and replacements. This only
increased the burden of the national debt. [Ref. 52]
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During the Vietnam War, the U.S. restriction on
transfer of military goods produce a search for alternative
source of arms in Europe and between 1967 and 1972, Brazil
purchased large amounts of European-made arms and increased
its dedication for developing its arms production
capabilities
.
The military government of President Carlos
Castello Branco, (1964-1967), created the Plan of
Industrial Mobilization in which a plan for the defense
sector was created within two industrial advisory councils.
The Federacao das Industries de Sao Paulo (FIESP) and the
Grupo Permanent de Mobilizacion Industrial (GPMI) . It thus
embodied an alliance between a group of manufacturing
industries in Sao Paulo and the army's Department of War
Materiel. During this period of economic recession, the
industrial sector was revived by the injection of
government funds that the military requested for
modernization of the industrial capacity. The new policy
also included the creation of military research institutes
and the creation of the political machinery needed to make
the defense industry more competitive by facilitating the
mechanism for acquiring of know how and subsidizing the
industry.
During the presidency of General Costa e Silva
(1967-1969) and during the period of the Brazilian
"Economic Miracle,' 1 several enforcement of the industrial
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policy were established and the period was characterized by
the policy of import substitution and the development of
new larger and more sophisticated weapons. In the desire
to make the defense industry self-sufficient, to build an
industrial and technological base, and to learn the
penetration of foreign markets, more than 100 joint ventures
coproduction agreement were started, and new legislation was
approved.
The legislation covered four basic areas:
1. Reduction of taxes for industrial products and higher
tariff on imported goods;
2. Reduction on prices on military goods destined for
foregoing markets;
3. Credit for domestically produced military goods; and
4. Access to preferential financing by the government.
[Ref. 53]
In 1977, as part of President Carter's human
rights policy, the U.S. Congress imposed restriction on its
aid to Brazil's military government on the grounds that it
was violating human rights. President Ernesto Geisel,
indignanant over the U.S. position unilaterally cancelled
several agreements of military cooperation between the two
countries. The military took advantage of the opportunity
to further develop the modern arms-production capacity.
The end of the U. S . -Brazilian military ties began the final
stage of the development of an indigenous Brazilian defense
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industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) statistics, in less than a
decade, Brazil had leaped from zero arms export to export
of about 2.3 billion in 1984. [Ref. 54] It is estimated
that roughly 5% of total Brazilian export and about 35% of
the total arms export are to so-called peripheral states,
b. Structure of Arms Production.
The boom in arms production in the 1970s and
1980s resulted from several sources and exhibited different
characteristics in different sectors.
The arms industry in Brazil has a varying
structure being the more important factor to mention its
composition by state-owned industries and by highly
influenced by the government, but private industries.
In the government part, the main component is the
company IMBEL (Industria Brasileira de Material Belico)
which is composed of the former state arsenals (except for
the naval yard) and other state enterprises producing small
arms and ammunition. The company was created in 1975 with
the objective of streamlining, commercializing, and
coordinating the state's arns production. This company
also markets products of the private arms industries.
There are in Brazil many forms of mixed state and
private capital, for example, via prescribed shareholding or
via state institutions, such as the branches of the armed
services, regional authorities, banks or regional
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development funds. A regional state enterprise (Minas
Gerais) took the initiative in creating a small helicopter
industry. A major impetus for the start of production of
armored vehicles uses the formation of a joint group of the
armed forces and industrialist from the Sao Paulo Region in
1965 (Grupo Permanente de Mobilizacao Industrial)
.
[Ref . 55]
Another important sector of the arms industries
are the multi-national companies. They supply licenses and
components for the arms industries but they also invest in
the Brazilian's industry. For example, in 1982 Ferranti
(UK) took 49 % ownership in Sistemas Ferranti do Brazil, in






The Brazilian arms industry is able to produce a
wide variety of aircraft, missiles, rockets, armored
vehicles and to produce naval vessels and small arms and
products. Appendix shows that major arms systems produced
by Brazil include 18 types of aircraft, 10 armored
vehicles, three types of missiles and seven types of ships.
Table 4-3, shows the production of small arms and
ammunition in Brazil and its sources of technology.
d. Exports and Policies.
Although there is no doubt that Brazil has
become one of the more important Third World exporters of
arms, exact figures are not available. [Ref. 56] According
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TABLE 4-3
ORDNANCE PRODUCTION IN BRAZIL
PRODUCER TECHNOLOGY COMMENT
PISTOLS
PASAM Itajube FR Germany Mauser
Colt 1911A1 Itajube USA
Model 92 Beretta Italy Late 1960s
Tauros .38 ii it
Rossi .38 Rossi
RIFLES
Mosque FAL Itajube FR Germany
FAL 7.62mm ii FN (Belgium)
FAP ii it
Para FAL it it
Falbina it it

























to unofficial Brazilian sources, arms exports exceeded $1
billion for the first time in 1980 and had more than
doubled by 1984. For the arms industry, it is convenient to
claim extraordinary export achievements, but as far as
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specific transactions are concerned, the principles of
business are evoked to justify non-disclosure. [Ref. 57]
Economically, the Brazilian strategy has been to orient is
arms industry toward export, as means to obtain externally
originated "cheap financing" for the development of a
sophisticated and expensive industrial sector. Hence, the
country is developing a capability to produce weapons, and
receiving socioeconomic benefits (technology, trained
manpower, know-how, industrial parks, and so on) , without
excessively straining the local economy. While the primary
motivations for the arms industry have not been economic,
there still are major economic benefits resulting from its
development. The trend, therefore, is toward the growth of
the arms industry with strong economic motivations—
a
trend unlikely to change.
Finally, the Brazilian arms industry's importance
as an instrument of foreign policy must be stressed. Over
the last fifteen years, Brazil has maintained what some
have called an ambiguous foreign policy. This ambiguity
was expressed by means of keeping good relations with both
the developed countries and the Third World, without making
a full commitment to either. Whether this is a tenable
long-term strategy is unknown. But for the arms industry,
Brazilian closeness to the Third World is crucial and
reciprocal since it allows Brazil to court less developed
countries who may become commercial clients, political
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supporters, or allies. This is being done partly with arms
supply, a process that helps to increase political leverage.
Last, but not least, the implementation of this policy has







Before 1973, the Chilean armed forces were not
visibly involved in economic or politics. They supported
the economic policy of slow, mainly inward-oriented
industrialization, offering few products to the world
market, mainly copper.
In 1973, the situation changed with the coup
d'etat that caused the overthrow of the government of
President Salvador Allende. With the new government, the
military expenditures were increased, and an ultra-liberal
path of development was tried that reduced the state
involvement in the economy and reduced trade barriers.
The 1973 coup d'etat also brought a military embargo from
Great Britain and other countries. F.R. Germany stopped
signing new contracts but did not invoke a formal embargo.
In 1977, the U.S. government of President Carter ordered an
arms embargo based on violations of human rights which
strongly affected the Chilean resupply, since Chile was
then heavily dependent on U.S. weapon deliveries.
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b. The Industry
Limited small-arms production seems to have
existed in Chile since 1811. Navy shipyards have done
repair work since the creation of the Navy in the last
century. Some experimental aircraft were designed and
flown by the Air Force in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
All these very limited activities were under the direction
of the respective branches of the armed forces. Since its
inception in 1960, the most important activity has been the
Astilleros y Maestranza de la Armada (ASMAR) with its
shipyards in Talcahuano, Valparaiso and Punta Arenas, on the
southern tip of the continent. Projects for small-arms
production have been united in the Army's Fabricas y
Maestranzas del Ejercito (FAMAE) , situated in Santiago.
The Air Force's activities stopped in the 1960s, but were
revived again in the late 1970s.
Since the late 1970s, state-owned production
capacities have been expanded, and new projects have been
started. A large swimming dock was built at ASMAR as a
joint venture of ASMAR and the Spanish naval shipyard
Bazan. New facilities for the Punta Arenas Yard, valued at
$13 million, are financed by the South African Industrial
Corporation as a joint venture of ASMAR and Sandock Austral
(South Africa)
.
The Army's ordnance factory, FAMAE, opened new
production facilities in 1983 with modern
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computer-controlled machine tools for metal cutting and
drilling. The Air Force decided in April 1980 to produce
foreign aircraft under license. The Industria Aeronautica
(Indaer) at El Bosque was set up to assemble, later
produce, and then design aircraft. In 1984, its name was
changed to ENAER (Empresa Nacional de Aeronautica)
.
In the late 1970s, a substantial private arms
industry also developed. The most important company is
Cardoen, which was set up in 1977 by Carlos R. Cardoen, who
had studied engineering in the United States. Cardoen
produces a wide spectrum of munitions, security equipment
and especially armored vehicles, and has plans to enter
aircraft production (including helicopters). It produces
parts for ENAER and equipment for the mining industry.
Other producers of mining equipment and machines have tried
to enter the arms market, encouraged by the government's
attitude not to buy only from its own arsenals. One such
company is Makina which, among other small contracts, won
the competition for a patrol vehicle for the Air
Force. [Ref . 59]
c . The Weapons .
The Chilean arms industry has provided the
country with various types of weapons system. In the
aeronautical area, it has been able to establish an
assembly line for PA-28 Dakota (1980) in collaboration with
the American Piper Industries. It has assemble a French
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fighter Mirage and, in 1982, from the follow-on-development
of the PA-28, the training aircraft T-35 Pillan was
produced. In 1984, an agreement between Spain and Chile
was signed to establish a production line of the basic
trainer aircraft C-101 Aviojet of the Construcciones
Aeronauticas Sociedad Anonima (C.A.S.A.) of Spain. Also, in
1980, it selected the Swiss Mowag Piranha armored vehicle to
be produced in the country, and from other licensed
production and some further improvement and technology
incorporation and modifications it has produced three other
vehicles, the VTP-1 ORCA, from the German TM-125, the
BMS-1, Aucran from the U.S. M3A1 and the Mowag Piranha.
ASMAR, is capable of doing all the ship repair
and maintenance work of the Chilean Navy. This include the
capacity to overhaul submarines. It is also able to
construct non-sophisticated ships.
The army ordnance factory is capable of producing
a wide range of small arms, ammunition and other ordnance.
The factories of CARDOEN are specialist in the production
of bombs, grenades, and mines. Table 4-4 shows the
ordnance production in Chile.
d . Exports
Arms exports from Chile were, until 1984, limited
to small batches of ammunition and small arms. Efforts
have been made to increase exports, in line with the
general economic policy of exporting manufactured products.
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This would also help to recover some of the expenditure
that financed the weapon systems designed for export, such
as the various APCs. In 1981, a FAMAE delegation toured
Africa and the Middle East. In 1984, Cardoen sold cluster
bombs to Iraq. The Pillan trainer aircraft was ordered by-
Spain. [Ref . 60]
TABLE 4-4
ORDNANCE PRODUCTION IN CHILE
SMALL ARMS
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The armed forces have only very limited power in
Mexican politics. After the revolution of 1910, a
coalition between most of the political groups took
exclusive control, deliberately neutralizing the Army.
An important factor in Mexico's foreign policy is
its proximity to the USA. While there is a strong feeling
54
of domination, it has not led to efforts to arm against
this neighbor. Mexico maintains small armed forces (about
120,000 soldiers in 1983), whose main function is internal,
which can be seen in the emphasis on light arms,
b. The Industry.
Mexico has a diversified industrial structure,
the result of deliberate economic policy aimed at
substituting domestic products for imports. However, in
many cases both the technology and capital come from the
USA and west European countries. Mexico, a country with
large-scale oil production, had a few years of financial
relief in the late 1970s, but large-scale investment in the
oil industry and the high level of government spending soon
caught up. In 1982, the Mexican debt was so high that the
country had to ask for extensive rescheduling. [Ref . 61]
In the arms production grounds, Mexico has been
reported to have decided to produce Israel aircraft but the
project have never taken place.
The more important structure to mention is the
government diesel national (DINA) which produce armored
vehicles and the shipyards of Veracruz, Tampico and
Guerrero which have produced most of the new Navy ships used
by Mexican Navy. (Most of the ships used by the Mexican
Navy are U.S. World War II ships.)
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c. The Weapons.
As is shown in Appendix, arms industry have
been able to produce one armored vehicle, four types of
ships and several types of ammunition and small arms.
Appendix show the major conventional weapons systems
produced by Mexico and in Table 4-5, can be seen the small
arms and ammunition product.
d. Exports.
The author could not find any information or
indication of Mexican arms exports.
TABLE 4-5






















5 . Peru .
a. Background.
Since independence in 1826, Peruvian politics
has been under the ultimate control of the military. The
military was in alliance with the landowners and mining
companies, both Peruvian and international, until the 1960s,
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when facade democracy slowly emerged towards more
representation. After 1967, a radical military government
increased military expenditures and procured most of its
weaponry from the Soviet Union. In 1975, the military
radicals were ousted by a more conservative military
government. Some of the reforms initiated by the former
government were reversed and procurement of modern weapons
was stepped up (mostly from the Soviet Union) . Elections
were held in 1980, a time of severe economic crisis,
resulting in a civilian government.
Peru has not been able to improve its economic
situation: it is heavily indebted, and aid donors have
criticized the high level of military expenditure which
substantially added to this indebtedness. [Ref. 62]
b. The Industry.
The most prominent field of arms production in
Peru is shipbuilding. The Servicios Industriales de la
Marina (SIMA) was established in 1950 by the Navy at
Callao. Shipyard facilities had existed there earlier, but
the Navy intended to expand the facilities for
maintenance, repair and production, including work for the
Peruvian merchant marine. In 1973, the legal status of SIMA
was changed; it became a private company, though owned by
the government and operated by the Navy through a board
consisting entirely of active admirals.
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SIMA currently has four production sites. The
largest, employing about 3,500 people, is at Callao near
the main naval base. Work is about equally divided between
repair and construction. The small arms factory SIMA Cefar
(Centro de Fabricacion de Armas) employs about 600 people.
The other two shipyards are at naval bases at Chimbote and
Iquitos on the Amazon River. They basically do maintenance
and repair work both for the Navy and commercial customers,
but have also built small boats, tugs, landing craft and
patrol craft for the Navy. The Iquitos yard employs about
300 people. In late 1982, the Chimbote yard employed about
600 people. Employment has increased since then, when
activity was shifted from Callao —where space is limited
—
to Chimbote. [Ref. 63]
Indumil (Industrias Militares del Peru) is run by
the Army the same way SIMA is run by the Navy. The Air
Force has a similar company, called Indaer (Industrial
Aeronautica del Peru) . Both were established in their
present form in 1973, in the case of Indumil combining
activities that had been going on at various smaller
production units under the guidance of the War Ministry.
c. The Products.
The Peruvian arms industries have been able to
produce a trainer/ground attack aircraft designed by Italian
Airmacchi but the production plant was shelved for financial
reasons. In 1982, a contract was signed with
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Dassault-Breguet to supply modernization kits for Mirage V
and technical assistance. SIMA has, since the late 1950s,
built most of the small patrol craft and support ships for
the Peruvian Navy. In 1978, licensed production of two
modified Italian-designed Lupo Class frigates started.
This represented a substantially different type of
production, in terms of size, materials used, complexity of
construction, integration of weapon systems and skills
reguired. Almost all of the materials for these ships were
imported, while the civilian ships built by SIMA at Callao
on the average contain a local content of 50 per cent.
Production was simplified by building the ship not in
sections, as is done in Italy, but in one piece from the
keel up. Production was supervised by Italian engineers.
The integration of the weapon systems was also the task of
foreign engineers.
It took SIMA a long time to build the ships. The
first was laid down in 1978 and launched in 1982. The
fitting of weapon systems, electronics, and so on took more
than an additional year. The second was laid down in 1979,
and took egually long to complete. The reasons for the
drawn-out production are not very clear. One is that
funding was very insecure between 1976, when the order was
placed, and 1980. Another is that design changes had to be
made, not least because of the different production mode.
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In addition, the Peruvian yard seems to have run into
severe technical problems.
Another, less ambitious naval project is the
construction of Pas of the Spanish-designed PCP-50 Type at
the Chimbote yard. They are offered for export both as PCs
and as missile-armed FACs, though no missile fit has been
done at Chimbote so far. [Ref. 64]
Appendix shows the major arms system produced
by Peru and Table 4-6 shows the production of small arms
and ammunition in Peru and its production entity.
TABLE 4-6








The author could not find information about any
registered Peruvian arms exports.
C. SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGY.
One of the more difficult factors involved in
developing an arms production capability is achieving the
technology level required in today's arms systems. It is
the purpose of this section to review the concept of
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technology transfer, and to analyze the advantages and
disadvantage of the concepts of coproduction, licensing, and
"Life of Type" in the scope of alternative acquisition





Technology transfer is the process of transfering
from the industry in one country to the industry of another
technical design information, engineering, manufacturing
and production techniques for hardware systems.
2 Coproduction .
a. Definition.
Coproduction is defined as the result of a
government-to-government agreement, in which a contract is
signed by firms of two or more nations, which allows
foreign countries to share the other government orders,
domestic production, and third party sales. (It may
include industrial collaborating, work sharing, and off-set
agreement) . For example, a country which purchased a
foreign system participated in the production of some of
the parts or jointly produce the equipment by a joint
venture.
b. Advantages of Coproduction.
1) Facilitate the technology transfer;
2) Contribute to the unit-cost saving by increasing the
number of required systems to a level at which it can take
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advantage of the economies of scale. In general,
coproduction unit cost is expected to be lower than
independent production;
3) Reduce research and development costs and prevent the
duplication of the R&D exports;
4) Provide for standardization of equipment in the
producing countries;
5) Contribute to maintaining and increasing industrial
base;
6) Generates offset benefits in a range of industrial
and commercial compensat ionspractices required as
condition of military sales, i.e., supplier agrees to
purchase certain dollar value of the buyer's manufactured
product, raw material or services as a condition of the
sale. [Ref . 65]
7) Simplify maintenance and operational support of
military equipment and assure wartime supplies; and
8) Strengthens the relationship between governments
and facilitate interoperativity
.
c. Disadvantage of Coproduction.
1) It has been argued that military technology is
non-productive and that some is not adaptable to civilian
uses ;
2) High initial investment for coproduction facilities and
machinery may require considerable amount of foreign
currency. This could add to external debts;
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3) Because of the technology-absortion problem that the
country may experience, it may become dependent upon "white
collar mercenaries" to maintain and operate weapons systems.
4) The coproduction agreement involve transfers of
technology which have license or royalty fees to cover
technical data, engineering assistance and production
rights
;
5) It is believed that coproduction results in higher
cost than if the weapons had been purchased directly "off
the shelf" from the original manufacturer, resulting
mainly from shorter production runs, loss of learning
economies and duplicating tooling and cost of transferring
technology.
6) Coproduction agreements will produce equipment
designed for meeting the needs of the original countries,
and it will take a long time to modify the equipment for
specific requirements of the other country or countries.
7) Slow time of delivery is another negative
characteristic of coproduction, compared with buying "off
the shelf."
3 . Licensing .
a. Definition.
Licensed production is production made possible
by agreement under which developers of military hardware
provide data, patent rights, technical assistance, and
whatever else is necessary to enable production of the
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desired hardware by a source in another country. The
developer is usually compensated by licensing fees and/or
royalties on sales and various other means. [Ref. 66]
b. Advantage.
1) Licensing provides several advantages in technology
transfer, standardization, indus t r ia 1 -base job
opportunities, and maintenance—and operational—support
benefits
;
2) Licensed production has a better delivery schedule
than coproduction because only one nation is involved.
3) Licensed production is less politically involved than
coproduction and does not necessarily develop the same
strong relation between the parts developer and the
producer.
c. Disadvantage.
Licensed production have several disadvantages
between such as:
1) The high unit cost caused by reduced possibilities of
reaching economies of scales;
2) The required payment of royalties or fees for unit
produced;
3) The possible contractual limitations which could limit
the arms production for third parties;
4) Slow or limited technology transfer caused by the
right of the developer to hold the technical data; and
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5) Because of different sources, there is variation in
quality between competitive products.
4. " Life of Type Buy .
"
In the United States, when a weapon system or end
item of equipment reaches the end of its usefulness, it is
declared obsolete and, over a period of time, removed from
the inventories. As that system or equipment disappears,
its unique spare parts and various kinds of support
material disappear also. However, foreign governments which
have previously purchased the item may not be prepared to
either replace it or have the item lose its usefulness due
to a lack of spare parts. The resolution of this conflict
lies in the idea of System Support Buy Out.
SSBO consists, essentially, of notifying customers
who have previously bought a system or equipment that the
item and its unique support are going to be dropped from
the U.S. inventory systems and that, if the customer wants
to participate, he has an opportunity to have final
procurement of spare parts in sufficient range and depth to
support the customer's system or equipment for its
projected remaining useful life and, the opportunity to "Buy
Out" the remaining on hand stocks of repair and spare parts




D. COMMON FACTORS OF PRODUCING COUNTRIES.
There is no one single pattern in the development of
arms-production capabilities. Each country has its own
characteristics, circumstances and interests. Each one has
factors which differ from the others. However, it is the
intention of this section to highlight the facilitating
factors and steps which are common to most of the
implementing processes of arms-production capabilities in
LDCs.
1 . Facilitating Factors .
The most significant factors facilitating the
implementation of arms production capabilities are:
a. The amount of capital available for investment. Arms
industry development requires enormous amounts of capital,
especially if the program is developed completely
independent of foreign assistance. This puts a strain on
LDC financial resources, and explains why so many weapons
programs have been terminated even after production has
begun. It explains also why the richer countries among the
Third World are the ones who are more often the weapons
producers. Even the inexpensive labor cost of LDCs do not
ipso facto make production cheaper, since other factors
counterbalance the wage scale benefits, such as
infrastructure, specialized materials, and the know-how
needed. In fact, these other factors usually make arms
production more expensive than outright purchase.
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b. The amount of landmass and population. Although
there are exceptions, such as Israel and Singapore, most of
LDC arms producers are large countries with large military
establishments to absorb weapons and equipment. Also having
a large population facilitates greater specialization among
the workforce and the marshalling of a critical mass of
personnel. Large countries have large militaries and these
in turn permit economies of scale to take place in
production runs. Large armies are correlated with large
landmasses. All large, heavily populated countries have
large armies, and nearly all these countries have
significant arms production programs.
c. The possession of technically trained manpower, a
research base, and educated technicians in required areas.
d. The possession of an industrial base is a crucial
facilitating factor in the development of an arms
production capability.
e. The possession of a supportive government
administration will also facilitate the development of an
arms-production capability.
2 . Implementing Process of Arms Production Programs .
Once a LDC decides undertake an arms production
program and begins devoting resources to it, there is a
fairly predictable series of steps that the country goes
through in its pursuit of arr.s-production capability.
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a. Decision. The first and most important step is the
decision to undertake an arms-production program. This
decision may be a fully detailed plan or develop as
opportunities emerge.
b. Setting of Maintenance Facilities. Facilities for
services and overhaul of weapons are set up, and relations
between the armed forces and the local industries are
developed.
c. Licenses are obtained for assembling kits produced in
other countries. Technical information is transferred and
personnel is trained.
d. Small parts and components are manufactured by the
local industry under supervision, and assembled kits are
available to be sold to foreign countries.
e. Assembly of major weapons systems is started under
licensing or coproduction agreements. Production lines and
factories are installed, or other lines are adopted to
produce military eguipment.
f. Modifications to coproduced or licensed equipment are
incorporated and a larger proportion of domestically
manufactured parts and components are included.
g. The design and the production of equipment are
incorporated into major arms systems.
h. Domestically designed and manufactured of major
weapon system utilize foreign crucial parts, i.e.
domestically produced aircraft use foreign engines.
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It is the purpose of this chapter to analyze the
characteristic of Venezuela in the scope of developing an
arms reduction capability. We shall review the country's
historical background, the economic sectors more relate to
arms production, the government structure and the
Venezuelan arms industry.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.
Until 1935, Venezuelan history was characterized by
long periods of authoritarian rule including the regimes of
Jose Antonio Paez (1830-46 and 1861-63), Antonio Guzman
Blanco (1870-88) and Juan Vicente Gomez (1908-35),
alternating with shorter periods of more democratic
instability. Venezuela's evolution on modern democratic
lines dates from the death of Gomez in 1935. The process
was interrupted by a military regime, headed by Marcos
Perez Jimenez, between 1948 and 1958, but, since his
downfall, it has shown every sign of being consolidated.
The dominant figure in recent Venezuelan political history
was undoubtedly Romulo Betancourt, the founder of the
Accion Democratica (AD) party. Betancourt 's democratic
convictions derived form his early experiences of opposition
to Gomez, and from 1945 to 1948, he was provisional
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President under a revolutionary seven-member junta, which
had overthrown another dictator, Isaias Medina Angarita.
Betancourt was a realist, with a sound practical
understanding of Venezuela's place in the world. His
policies during his second period of office (1959-64) and
those of his successor, Raul Leoni, revived the nation's
finances after Perez Jimenez had left the economy heavily in
debt.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Venezuela's
principal export was coffee; Venezuela had been the world's
third largest producer of coffee in the 19th century, after
Brazil and Java. By the end of the Gomez era, petroleum
had overtaken coffee, and Venezuela's importance as a
petroleum exporter was enhanced by Mexico's nationalization
of its petroleum industry (in 1938) and by the outbreak of
the Second World War (in 1939). Gomez was a skilled
negotiator, although he made no clear effort to distinguish
between the interests of his country and those of himself
and his entourage. After 1935, Venezuela's capacity in
negotiation clearly increased, and it can claim to have been
responsible for much of the preliminary planning that
culminated in the creation of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) , of which Venezuela
was one of the five founder-members. OPEC was formally
constituted at a conference in Venezuela in January 1961.
Venezuela's petroleum industry was finally nationalized in
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1976, but the process was gradual and carefully
co-ordinated with the oil companies which operated in the
country. Venezuela's wealth has also been intelligently
used in restructuring civil-military relations, in bringing
to a swift and humane end the small guerrilla conspiracies
of the 1960s, and in promoting many advances in welfare and
education. Venezuelan consumerism is the most spectacular
in Latin America, and the benefits of the country's
prosperity are guite widely distributed. Public liberties
are secure, and Venezuela enjoys one of the best records in
the Americas for respecting human rights. Since 1945,
there has been substantial immigration from Spain, Portugal
and Italy, as well as from elsewhere in Latin America.
Venezuelan political parties are, by contrast with
the Latin Aermican norm, highly organized. Voting is
obligatory, but the high polling levels in Venezuelan
elections are more accurately explained by the competence
of the party organizations in mobilizing their supporters,
by the positive advantages in having voted, and by a civic
ethos that continues to place a high value on
participation. After the return to democratic government
in 1958, the AD ruled for the presidential terms of Romulo
Betancourt and Dr. Raul Leoni, but in 1969, the Partido
Social-Cristiano (COPEI) , succeeded in having Dr. Rafael
Caldera Rodriguez elected. Since then, the two parties
have alternated in power. Expectations that the political
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left would increase its single-figure percentage level of
support have been repeatedly disappointed. The debt crisis
was reflected in Venezuela by the more than usually
decisive victory, in 1983, of the AD over COPEI at the end
of the presidency of Dr. Luis Herrera Campins, when Dr.
Jaime Lusinchi was elected.
In international affairs, Venezuela has, in recent
years, sought to increase its influence in the Carribean
region and Central America. The COPEI Government of
President Herrera Campins gave significant support to Jose
Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democrats in El Salvador.
The AD is a member of the Socialist International, and
Venezuela is a member (with Columbia, Mexico and Panama) of
the Contadora Group, which is working for the negotiated
settlement of disputes in Central America. Carlos Andres
Perez Rodriguez of the AD, who was President of Venezuela
from 1974 to 1979 and aspires to the presidency again in
1988, is an active internationalist. Venezuela has
historical claims to much of the territory of Guyana,
formerly the colony of British Guiana. [Ref. 68]
C . ECONOMY
1. General.
The Venezuelan econcry is dominated by the petroleum
industry, which is the major source of government revenue
and of export earnings. The pattern of economic growth has
thus been determined largely by the level of receipts from
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petroleum exploitation and sales. The channelling of the
country's petroleum revenues through central government
spending resulted in high rates of economic growth and
general improvements in the standard of living. However,
the onset of world recession and the slump in export demand
for petroleum marked a turning-point in Venezuela's
economic fortunes. Exacerbated by the heavy dependence on
imports, and by deflationary policies, Venezuela's real
gross domestic product (GDP) contracted, with the decline in
petroleum exports, by 1.7% in 1980, which contrasted with
positive growth rates averaging 4%-5% annually in the 1970s.
Faced with a rising external debt, further reductions in
petroleum revenues and a steadily increasing import bill,
the Government was forced to reduce the previously high
levels of public spending.
Economic activity remained virtually stagnant, with
real GDP falling by 0.3% in 1981 and growing by 0.7% in
1982. The recession worsened in 1983, and GDP contracted
by 5.6%, in real terms, against a background of stringent
monetary policies, a sudden flight of capital, reductions in
public expenditure, de facto devaluation of the bolivar and
the introduction of higher imDort barriers. Although
successful debt rescheduling, increased petroleum earnings,
further devaluation of the currency and a
balance-of-payments surplus led to a renewal of confidence
in the economy, GDP registered a 1.7% decline, in real
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terms, during 1984. A relaxation of the Government's
austerity programme and the easing of controls on credit
and foreign exchange were forecast to facilitate real
growth of between 1% and 2% in 1985, although much will
depend on the prevailing level of petroleum revenues.
The population of Venezuela was officially estimated
to be 16,399,697 at mid 1983, and was increasing at an
annual rate of 2.9%. More than 80% of the population are
urban dwellers, of whom onefifth reside in and around the
capital, Caracas. About twothirds of the population are
less than 30 years of age, and slightly more than one half
are under 20. Venezuela's economically active population
numbers about 5., and is expanding rapidly. More than one-
third of the working population are employed in the public
sector, and about 14% are engaged in agriculture. Industry
as a whole, including construction, employees 23% of the
work force. However, the major industry in economic terms,
petroleum production and processing, employs fewer than
50,000 workers. The contraction in economic activity led
to an increase in the rate of unemployment from about 7% of
the labor force in 1982 to 12.4% in 1984, and to 18% by May
1985. According to unofficial estimates, the 1984 rate may
have been as high as 20%. Underemployment has also




Venezuela possesses vast mineral wealth, with large
reserves of iron ore, bauxite, coal, gold, diamonds and
silver. There are also deposits of zinc, copper, lead,
phosphorus, nickel and uranium. However, the nonpetroleum
mining sector contributes less than 1% to the total GDP.
Venezuela's annual production of iron ore, from the mines
in Ciudad Guayana, has fallen sharply from the peak of
26.4m. metric tons (gross weight), reached in 1974. In
1983, total output was only 9.3m tons, of which 7.4m. tons
were exported. Higher levels of production were forecast
for 1984, with Siderurgica del Orinoco (Sidor) , the state-
controlled steel company, taking 5m. tons, and a further
4m. tons being exported to the USA under long term
contracts. However, it was announced in 1985 that the U.S.
Government would seek to restrict Venezuela's exports of
steel to U.S. markets in forthcoming years. Ferrominera
Orinoco plans to supply the needs of the national steel
industry with iron ore from its new high-grade ore mine at
San Isidro, and from other nines at Cerro Bolivar, Altamira
and El Pao.
Despite the presence of vast reserves, Venezuela's
annual coal production had fallen from 120,000 metric tons
in 1977 to 45,000 tons by 1984. About three quarters of
present output is controlled by Minas Carbon de Lobatera,
which operates in Tachira province. Proven reserves of
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bauxite have been assessed at 500m. metric tons, and
planned exploitation of deposits at Los Pijijuaos forms an
essential part of government plans for an integrated
aluminum industry. Bauxite production was expected to
commence in mid0186, and to reach full annual production of
4.4m. tons in 1990. Production of gold, mainly from the El
Callao mine, rose from 416 kg in 1980 to 971 kg in 1983,
although more than 65% of total domestic output is smuggled
out of the country. Diamond mining, which is also adversely
affected by smuggling, has declined in recent years, with
production falling to 360,000 carats in 1983, compared with
825,000 carats in 1980.
3 . Petroleum and Natural Gas .
The petroleum industry is the mainstay of the
economy, accounting for more than 20% of GDP and a
consistent 95% of total exports earnings; it provided 65%
of total government revenue in 1981, 51% in 1982 and 44% in
1983. Venezuela ranked as the third largest petroleum
producer within OPEC, and the eighth largest producer in
the world, in 1984. Production of crude petroleum, which
derives mostly form the Maracaibo, Apure Barinas and
Eastern Venezuela basins, steadily declined from a peak
annual level of 3.7m. barrels per day (b/d) in 1970 to
2.2m. b/d in 1980. Recurrent agreements with OPEC on
production guotas subsequently reduced average output from
2m. b/d in 1981 to 1.7m. b/d in early 1983. In the face of
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declining export demand and reduced domestic consumption,
Venezuela agreed to a revised OPEC production 'ceiling' of
1.55m. b/d in November 1984. Petroleum production averaged
1.69m. b/d in 1984.
4 . Manufacturing .
Venezuela's manufacturing sector contributed 23% to
GDP in 1982, of which nonpetroleum manufacturing accounted
for 12%. A strong commitment to a policy of industrial
diversification during the 1960s, to reduce dependence on
petroleum, led to the establishment of a wide range of
enterprises engaged in metalworking and the production of
consumer goods. In the 1970s, the emphasis was shifted
towards promoting export-oriented heavy industries, based
on the country's wealth of natural resources. Most of the
major capital-intensive industries are state-owned, and are
located in the Ciudad Guayana development zone, to the east
of Caracas. The private sector is dominated by small-scale
industries and is mainly involved in import substitution.
After expanding at average real rates of 6.4% and
4.8% annually in the 1960s and 1970s respectively,
manufacturing experienced a period of sluggish growth and
falling demand. Although the introduction of a three-tier
exchange rate and higher import barriers in 1983 greatly
benefited some sectors, such as textiles, food processing,
beverages, metals, paper and plastics, other sectors, which
are not geared towards export and are heavily dependent on
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imported inputs, continued to decline. In late 1984, in
an attempt to stimulate production, price controls were
relaxed, and manufacturers were encouraged to gear
production more towards exports. Despite an encouraging
3.9% rise in manufacturing output during 1984, the sector
continued to suffer from foreign exchange restrictions,
high import costs, falling consumer spending and reductions
in capital investment.
Aluminum has replaced iron ore as Venezuela's second
most important export commodity, after petroleum. Following
a period of decline (due to low world prices and high
production costs), the country's output of aluminum
increased to about 377,000 metric tons in 1984,
representing a 20% increase over the level of 1982.
Meanwhile, favorable exchange rates and a rise in world
demand boosted exports by over 40% between 1983 and 1985.
During the 1970s more than US $2, 500m. was invested in
expanding production capacity at aluminum companies, Alcasa
and Venalum. Nominal annual capacity is currently about
400,000 metric tons, and was projected to rise to 580,000
tons by 1986. Annual production of hard alloys was
forecast to rise to 100,000 tons by 1986, while aluminum
ingot capacity at the Ciudad Guayana plant was to expand to
200,000 tons per year. The Interalumina refinery at Puerto
Ordaz, the largest of its kind in Latin America, cost
$1.250m. and began production in 1983. It was expected to
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reach its full capacity of lm. metric tons of alumina per
year in 1985. The opening of this plant and the discovery
of substantial bauxite deposits at Los Pi j iguaos has
brought the country closer to achieving a full-integrated
aluminum industry.
Between 1976 and 1984 annual steel capacity at the
Matanzas plant of the state-owned Siderurgica del Orinoco
(Sidor) was steadily increased from 1.2m tons to 4.8m
tons. However, as a result of stagnation in the local
construction industry, domestic sales fell from a peak of
2.6m. tons in 1977 to 1.3m tons in 1983. The reduction in
domestic demand was more than offset in 1983 and 1984 by
rising steel exports, which boosted total output of crude
steel to over 2.8m. metric tons in 1984 (compared with
1.8m. tons in 1981), making Veneuzuela the third largest
steel producer in Latin America.
In 1984, Venezuela's production of locally-assembled
motor vehicles reached its lowest level for 10 years, with
financial losses estimated at more than 1,000m. bolivares.
Virtually all of the 16 major car and truck assemblers are
currently operating at about 50% of capacity, owing to the
lack of parts, to the imposition of rigid price controls,
to higher production costs and to falling consumer demand.
A 10-year rationalization plan for the industry was
launched in 1985, involving the standardization of parts,
the import of cars in 'knock-down' condition (ready for
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re-assembly) and increased supplies of locally-manufactured
components.
The petrochemical industry, which encompasses a
wide range of products (such as fertilizers, plastics,
ammonia and sulphuric acid) , suffered heavy losses during
the late 1970s. However, increased utilization of natural
gas as fuel and feedstock, the imposition of import
controls and an increase in state investment have since
improved production. [Ref. 69]
C. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
1 . General .
The Constitution of Venezuela was promulgated in
January 1961. The Federal Republic of Venezuela is divided
into 20 States, one Federal district, two Federal
Territories and 72 Federal Dependencies. The States are
autonomous but must comply with the laws and Constitution
of the Republic.
2 . The Legislative Power.
Is exercised by Congress, divided into two
Chambers: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.
Senators are elected by universal suffrage, two to
represent each State, and two to represent the Federal
District. There are in addition other Senators, their
number being determined by law, who are selected on the
principle of minority representation. Ex-Presidents of the
Republic are life members of the Senate. Deputies are also
81
elected by direct universal and secret suffrage, the number
representing each State being at least two and for each
Federal Territory one. A deputy must be of Venezuelan
nationality and be over 21. Ordinary sessions of both
Chambers begin on the second day of March of each year, and
continue until the sixth day of the following July;
thereafter, sessions are renewed from the first day of
October to the thirtieth day of November, both dates
inclusive. The Chamber of Deputies is empowered to
initiate legislation. Congress also elects a
Controller-General to preside over the audit Office
(Contraloria de la Nacion) , which investigates Treasury
income and expenditure, and the finances of the autonomous
institutes
.
3 . The Executive Power.
Is vested in a President of the Republic elected by
universal suffrage every five years, who may not serve two
consecutive terms. The President is empowered to discharge
the Constitution and the laws, to nominate or remove
Ministers, to take supreme command of the Armed Forces, to
direct foreign relations of the State, to declare a state
of emergency and withdraw the civil guarantees laid down in
the Constitution, to convene extraordinary sessions of the
Congress, to administer national finance and to nominate
and remove Governors of the Federal District and the
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Federal Territories. The President also appoints an
Attorney-General to act as a legal arbiter for the state.
4
. The Judicial Power .
The judicature is headed by the Supreme Court of
Justice. The judges are divided into penal and civil and
mercantile judges; there are military, juvenile, labor,
administrative litigation, finance and agrarian tribunals.
In each State, there is a superior court and several
secondary courts which act on civil and criminal cases.
The Supreme Court comprises 15 judges appointed by
the Congress in joint session for nine years, five of them
to be appointed every three years. It is divided into
three courts, each with five judges; political
administrative; civil, mercantile and labor cassation;
penal cassation. When these three act together the court
is in full session. It has the power to abrogate any laws,
regulations or other acts of the executive or legislative
branches conflicting with the Constitution. It hears
accusations against members of the Government and high
public officials, cases involving diplomatic
representatives and certain civil actions arising between
the State and individuals.
E . EDUCATION
Primary education in Venezuela is free and compulsory
between the ages of seven and 13 years. Secondary
education lasts for five years. In 1982/83, 383,575
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children attended nursery schools; 2,998,083 were
enrolled at primary and secondary schools; and 282,274
students received higher education. The adult illiteracy
rate is estimated to be 15 per cent. There are plans to
introduce a basic cycle of six years at primary school and
three years at secondary school. Experimental courses
began in 1975. There are 11 state universities, 106 higher
education institutes and 13 private universities. The
proposed education budget for 1985 was 15,692m. bolivares.
By 1976, the Ayacucho scholarship programme, founded in
1974, had placed 11,000 students in universities and other
institutes of higher education, including 6,500 students
abroad. The Instituto Nacional de Cooperacion Educativa
(INCE) has trained some 400,000 students in a wide range of
technical subjects, in an attempt to reduce the chronic
shortage of skilled labor.
F. THE VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES
1 . General .
The Venezuelan constitution established in its
article, No. 132, that the armed forces are the
"institutions organized by the state to ensure the national
defense, the stability of the democratic institutions, and
the respect for the constitution and laws."
The total armed forces is composed of 71000 regular
members, which are organized in four branches: Army, Navy,
Air Force and National Guard.
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2 . The Venezuelan Army .
The Venezuelan army is composed of 34000 regular
members which include selective conscripts with a two years
service obligation.
a. Operational Structure.
1) 5 Army Division (1 Calvary)




1 air defence battalion
3) 6 Infantry Brigades
2 mechanized
11 heavy
13 light infantry battalions
4) 1 Cavalry Regiment
5 squadrons
5) 7 Artillery Battalions
6) 2 Anti-Aircraft Battalions
1 self-propeled
7) 3 Independent Anti-Aircraft Group
8) 2 Independent A/A Groups (Forming)
9) 5 Engineers Battalions
10) 1 Airborne Regiment
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b. Equipment.





Armored Fighting Vehicles :
a) Reconnaissance : 10 AML 245
30 M-8
60 M706E1
b) Armored Personal Carriers : 25 AMX-VCI
60 V-100
3) Artillery :
a) Howitzers : 105 mm 40 M-56 Pack
30 M-101 towed
155 mm 20 MK-F3
10 M109 Self-propeled
b) Multiple Rocket Launcher (s) :
160 mm LAR self-propeled
c) Mortar (s) : 81 mm 10
12 mm 8
4) Anti-tank :
a) Recoilless Launchers 106 mm
b) Anti-tank Guide Weapons SS-11
AS-11
5) Air Defense Guns :
4 r.n 3 6 Breda L/7 towed
20 nm 12 AML-S530 twins
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self-propeled
40 mm 20 M-42A1 twins
6) Army Aviation :








3 . The Venezuelan Navy
The Venezuelan navy is composed of 10000 regular
members (including some conscripts) organized in the Fleet,





The headquarters is located in Caracas and the
main bases are: Puerto Cabello, La Guaira, Puerto de Hierro,
Puerto LaCruz, Punto Fijo, El Amparo, Turiamo, La Orchila,
and the scientific base of Las Aves.
b. The Fleet
The fleet is composed of:
1) 6 frigates type Sucre (Lupo) with 8 otomat








5) 5 Auxilliary vessels
2 transport
3 cargo vessels
6) 6 Patrol Boats
3 with otomat
3 with oto-melara 102/72









10 Fuch S/transport Panzer 1
18 105 M.M.
6 MK-42 A/A guns
d) Coast Guard
( 1) Organization
3 bases La Guaira, Maracaibo, La Banquilla
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(2) Equipment
2 frigates - Type Almirante Clemente
6 Vosper - 121fl, 2 msl, 460n
e) Naval Air Force
1) 1 squadron - 8 S2E
2) 1 squadron - 6 AB-212-A5
3) 1 squadron - 3 Casa C-212/200 MR
4) 1 Transport squadron with 1 DHC-7
1 King Air 200




4 . The Venezuelan Air Force
The Venezuelan Air Force is composed of 5000 men
located in 7 main bases: Libertador, Mariscal Sucre,
Barcelona, Barquisimeto, Puerto Ayacucho, Puerto Ordaz, and
Maracaibo.
a) Organization
1) 2 Bomber/Reconnaissance Squadrons - 20 BA
Camberra
2) 1 Fighter/Ground Attack Squadron - 13 Mirage
3) 3 Interceptor/Ground Attack Squadron
17 Northlrop F-5
16 Mirage V
24 General Dynamics F-16 A/B/D
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4) 1 Counter-Insurgency Squadron
12 OV-10E Bronco
5) 1 Presidential Squadron
1 Boeing 737
1 McDonnell - Douglas DC-9
1 Gulftream II
1 Cessna 500
2 Helicopters Bell 214
2 Helicopters Bell 412




13 SA-316B Alouette III
10 Bell VH-1D/H
6 Agusta A-109A
7) 1 Training Group
10 BAe Jet Provost
20 Rockwell T2D Buckeye
23 Beach T-34 Mentor
8) Air-to-Air Missiles
R-530 Magic
9) 1 Parachute Battalion
b) Equipment on order
1) 15 F-5A Fighters
2) 24 IA-58 Pucara
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3) 5 F-5B Fighters
4) 30 EMB-312 Tucano Training
5) 16 Bell 206
6) 4 Agusta A-109 Helicopters
5 . Venezuelan National Guard .
a. General.
"Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperacion, " or National
Guard is composed of 22,000 men under the authority of the
Defense Ministry. It accomplishes functions of internal






(1) Armored Fighting Vehicles

















3 Helicopter Agusta 109-A
12 Bell 206
6 Bell 475
G. VENEZUELAN MILITARY INDUSTRY.
1 . General
Venezuela's arms industry started during the 19 th
century with the fabrication of small arms and ammunition
to support the independence war which took place from 1810
to 1823. During the 1930s, an attempt to build an armored
personal carrier was made, using Ford and Chevrolet
chassis. During the 1940s, the artillery group of Maracay
worked in designing a rocket, and during the 1950s, they
worked in designing a special kind of gun based in a
mixture of oxygen and hydrogen. At the beginning of the
1960s, a light portable mortar was designed and
constructed. It is to be noted that these were all
isolated and circumstantial attempts. [Ref. 70]
2 . Legal Basis .
a. Laws of Weapons and Explosives.
As early as 1939, the "Law of Weapons and
Explosives" (Ley Sobre Armas y Explosivos) established in
92
the Article No. 5, that "Only the national government can
establish war weapons and ammunition factories in the
country, according to the rules that previously promoted."
b. Decree-Law, No. 883.
The decree-Law No. 883 of April 29, 1975
established three very important bases for the development
of the Venezuelan arms production capability:
(1) It established the "National Security
Council for the Development of the Military Industry"
(Consejo Nacional para el Desarrollo de las Industrias
Militares) with the following functions:
a) To formulate the basic strategic and actions to be
taken by the military industries;
b) To propose to the national executive the political
procedures, and the developing plans and programs needed for
the total realization of the objectives of the industry;
c) To serve as consulting and coordinating branch for
research and studies related to the defense industries;
d) To review all the matters related to the military
industries that have to be submitted for government
approval ; and
e) To coordinate with the government's central
administration organization the needs for armaments,
ammunition, explosives, \r.i other related materials
required to accomplish with the national security policy.
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(2) It created the "Venezuelan Company of
Military Industries," (CAVIM) (Compania Anomima Venezolana
de Industrias Militares) with the following
characteristics
:
a) Join-stock company, is totally owned by the
government; and
b) It works under the policies of the "National Security
Council for the Development of the Military Industries."
(3) It gave the legal authority to the national
executive to grant, among other, the following incentives to
the military industry:
a) Restriction on imports and custom tariff;
b) Tax exonerations;
c) Direct or indirect subsidy to the military industries;
d) Financing of Research and Development;
e) Fiscal incentives for training programs;
f) Advantageous financing condition for the military
industries;
g) Facilitating administrative mechanism for the
entrance and stay of foreign techniques required by the
industry; and
h) Any other incentives that the national executive might
consider necessary.
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c . Other Related Laws
(1) Decree-Law No. 642. Creating the "National
Council to for the Development of the Naval Industry,"
December 29, 1974.
(2) Decree-Law . creating the "National Council
for the Development of the Aeronautic Industry."
(3) Decree Law No. 1308 Creating the "National
Council for Production and Supply," December 8, 1975.
(4) Decree-Law No. 921 . May 16, 1975, which
orders that as of December 31, 1980, 75% of all the
vehicles produced in the country should be made by the
national industry and that from 1980 to 1985, the
percentage should increase to 90%.
(5) Decree-Law No. 1336 . November 5, 1986
exonerating 50% income taxes of the profits directly related
to new investments in the production of goods for import
substitution.




CAVIM was created in 1976 as an independent company
with the purpose of executing the government's policies of
developing military industries and in accordance with the
norms and plans of the National Security Council for the
Development of Military Industries.
2 Organization .
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3 . Production .
CAVIM produces a wide variety of articles and
services required to support the operation, not only of the
military forces but to the oil, and general industry. The
chemical and metal-mechanic divisions have been able to
assimilate, create and diffuse technology and to interact
with the production community in order to better employ
the resources available in the country.
In the production area, the more important articles
to mention are the machine-gun Orinoco and the knife
"Pirana" both designed and produced by CAVIM.
Table 5-1 show the different products produced by

























































Geophysical Prospecting, use in oil
industry
Blasting gelatives (3 types)
TNT, civil and military use
Use in explosive production and
metal treatments
Sensitized slurry, water resistant
explosive
Water gel blasting agent, use in
construction, mining, etc.
Blasting agent
Casted explosive based on pentolite,
Use in oil industry
Casted explosive based on pentolite,
use in oil industry
Use in oil industry
Use for initiation of blasting agent
and slurry product, use in oil
industry
Geophysical prospecting, use in oil
industry
Geophysical prospecting, use in oil
industry
Explosive base on RDX, HNX or PYX;
use in oil industry
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Lightning conductos Radioactives, designed and
produced by CAVIM, 5 types
Metal Mechanic Wide variety of metal mechanic
Product products.
Foundings Non-ferreous founding articles
SOURCE: Revista Informativa CAVIM, 1986.
4. SERVICES
CAVIM also provide for services and technical
assistance to the armed forces and to the mining
metal-mechanic and construction industries. The more
important assistance services are:
a) Research and development programs for specific
objectives
;
b) Improvement in actual military eguipments;
c) Maintenance and repair of military vehicles, small
weapons, and optical equipments;
d) Technical advice in explosives use;
e) Material and chemical analysis;
f) Regain of ammunition, bombs and explosives;




5. CAVIM DEVELOPMENT PLANS
CAVIM development plans include for the near future
ambitious goals in the chemical and metal-mechanic














Reduce Cost and Imports
Import Substitution
Improve Production Capability
in Quantity and Quality
SOURCE Revista Information CAVIM 1986
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS.
1. The Venezuelan military expenditures tend to be
stable with respect to government income, and it does not
seem probable that a reduction can be expected in the near
future.
2. The economic situation of the country and the cost
of arms systems in the international markets make
importation of the arms an increasing burden to the
country's economy.
3. The resources expended in developing an arms
production capability will contribute to the country's
economic growth in a greater manner than those expended in
arms import.
4. The process of developing an arms production
capability requires— in addition to the decision to start
it—the constant and decisive support of the government,
and a reliable supply of financial, managerial, industrial,
and natural resources.
5. Venezuela has the required resources and the legal
basis required for developing an extensive arms-production
program.
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6. CAVIM, in its eleven years of existence, has
proved to be able to create assimilated and diffuse
technology and to grow in a harmonious and rational way.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
.
1. Venezuela should expand its arms industries
development program in order to better utilize its
production potential, reduce its imports, contribute to the
economic growth, and increase its political and economic
independence
.
2. The Venezuelan Company of Military Industries
should be the center of development and expand its




Further studies should be carried out to determine
the proper role of the private industry and coproduction or
licencing agreements, and to determine the best direction
for the military industry's growth.
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APPENDIX
REGISTER OF INDIGENOUS AND LICENSED PRODUCTION
OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA
COUNTRIES, 1950-84
Columns 1-3: Countries are listed in alphabetical order.
The weapon categories are in the order: aircraft, armoured
vehicles, missiles and ships. Weapon designations are
listed alphabetically within the weapon categories.
Column 4: gives the following information, listed
vertically: (a) weapon description, (b) producing company,
(c) the origin of the design (if licensed production, the
country granting the licence) , and (d) programme status by
end-1984 (in production, completed, cancelled, planned).
SOURCE: Arms Production in the Third World , Michael Brzoska





COUNTRY CATEGORY NATION DATA COMMENTS






Aero Lightplane Mainly for











































































































IA-58B COIN Developed from








IA-63 Adv trainer/ Design asssist-


















Armoured Model 77 TH Developed from




Model 81 TH Improved


































































































Azopardo Frigate Based on
Class AFNE King Class
Indigenous designed
Completed late 1930s
Bahia Support ship Carries 2
Paraiso Principe y helicop-
Menghi ters; can
Indigenous be used as
Completed icebreaker
Cabo S. LS Based on US
Antonio AFNE De Soto
Indigenous Class
Completed design






























































































































































































































EE-11 APC Arms; 12.7
Urutu Engesa mm Mg; also
Indigenous with 60/90
In production mm gun or
ATMs
EE-17 TD Arms; 10 5 -mm
Sucurri Engesa gun and
Indigenous MGs
Completed
EE-3 SC Arms; 5 7 -mm
Jararaca Engesa gun or
Indigenous ATMs
In production
EE-9 AC With 37-mm
Cascavel Engesa US gun,
Indigenous 90-mm



























































Piranha D.E. Vas- fully
concelos/CFA tested
Indigenous with






















Niteroi Frigate Arms ; 4











Roraima PC 1 exported
Class Maclaren to Para-
Indigenous guay
In production






Type 2 09, 3 Submarine In addi-









In production to 12 may
be built
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T-36 Trainer /ground Some design




Armoured BMS-1 APC Half-track
vehicles Alacran Cardoen based on
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